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The Employee's Home Office Deduction: The Problem of 
Duplicate Facilities 
The Internal Revenue Code expressly and impliedly allows tax-
payers to deduct many business-related expenses that also fill per-
sonal needs.1 However, the deductibility of home office expenses 
under the general provision for business expenses, section 162 of the 
I. E.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 162, 274 (entertainment expenses), 214 (certain 
household and dependent care expenses), 217 (moving expenses). 
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Code,2 has been a frequent subject of litigation.3 Section 162 requires 
that the employee establish that the expenses were "ordinary and 
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carry-
ing on any trade or business."4 Since it is well established that work-
ing for an employer is carrying on a trade or business within the 
statute,6 in order to secure a deduction for the home office in which 
he performs work for his employer an employee need only prove 
that his home office expenses were "ordinary and necessary." "Ordi-
nary" distinguishes deductible expenses from extraordinary expendi-
tures that must be capitalized and depreciated under section 167 of 
the Code.6 The Supreme Court has defined a "necessary" expense 
as one that is "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's conduct of 
his trade or business.7 One point of uncertainty is whether the ex-
penses of maintaining a home office are "necessary" where the em-
ployer provides adequate and available office facilities.8 
2. The relevant portions of section 162 read: 
(a) In general 
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses 
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, 
including-
(!) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal serv-
ices actually rendered; 
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other 
than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away 
from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and 
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the con-
tinued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to 
which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he had 
no equity. 
3. See, e.g., Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970); Stephen A. Bodzin, 
CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 32,115 (Sept. 4, 1973); LeRoy W. Gillis, CCH TAX CT. REP. 
Dec. 31,945(M) (April 24, 1973); Richard Keith Johnson, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 941 
(1972); Paul J. O'Connell, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 837 (1972); Christopher A. Rafferty, 
30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 848 (1971); James L. Denison, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1074 (1971). 
4. The term "trade or business" is frequently used but is not defined in the Internal 
Revenue Code. See Groh, "Trade or Business": What It Means, What It Is, What It Is 
Not, 26 J. TAX., Feb. 1967, at 78, 78. The term "trade or business" appears approxi-
mately 170 times in 60 Code provisions. Id. at 78. 
A taxpayer seeking a deduction for home office expenses may do so only if he 
itemizes his deductible expenses. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 63, 161. Further, only 
noncapital expenses (for example, rent, heat, and light) may be deducted under section 
162. Capital expenses resulting in improvements to the home must be depreciated 
under section 167. Presumably, only improvements affecting the portion of the home 
used for business purposes would be permitted to increase the total deduction avail-
able to the taxpayer. Cf. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 Cmr. BULL. 52, 53. 
5. See, e.g., David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 377-78 (1970); Harold A. Christensen, 17 
T.C. 1456, 1457 (1952); Ralph C. Holmes, 37 B.T.A. 865, 871-73 (1938); Peoples-
Pittsburgh Trust Co., 21 B.T .A. 588, 592 (1930), affd., 60 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1932). 
6. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966); Welch v. Helvering, 
290 U.S. III, 113-14 (1933); Stephen A. Bodzin, CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 
2932 (Sept. 4, 1973). 
7. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. Ill, 113 (1933). 
8. Where the employer does not provide such facilities, the taxpayer has been per-
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Because a home office occupies a portion of the physical area 
already maintained as a personal residence, the taxpayer who seeks 
to deduct a legitimate business-related expense must be distinguished 
from the taxpayer who seeks to deduct a portion of what are in fact 
his personal living expenses.9 Unfortunately, the Internal Revenue 
Service and the courts have developed conflicting tests for making 
this distinction. 
The Service's position is expressed in Revenue Ruling 62-180: 
The burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish (I) that, 
as a condition of his employment, he is required to provide his own 
space and facilities for performance of some of his duties, (2) that he 
regularly uses a part of his personal residence for that purpose, (3) 
the portion of his personal residence which is so used, (4) the extent 
of such use, and (5) the pro rata portion of the depreciation and ex-
penses for maintaining his residence which is properly attributable 
to such use. 
The deductible expenses of an employee, whose conditions of 
employment are such that he regularly uses a part of his residence in 
the performance of his duties as an employee, include a pro rata por-
tion of such items as rent, light, taxes, and interest on a mortgage. 
No portion of purely personal expenses attributable to family house-
hold purposes are deductible.10 
The examples accompanying Revenue Ruling 62-180 indicate 
that, as a practical matter, the taxpayer must establish either that 
his employer does not furnish adequate facilities or that the facilities 
furnished were not available when the required work was done.11 
Once this is established, the deduction is permitted only to the ex-
tent that the area is used for the performance of job-related work.12 
mitted to deduct home office expenses for some time, See, e.g., Herman E. Bishoff, 25 
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 538 (1966); Clarence Peiss, 40 T.C. 78 (1963); Morris S. Schwartz, 
20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 725 (1961); Freda W. Sandrich, 5 CCH Ta.x Ct, Mem, 234 (1946), 
9. The Commissioner has generally raised this issue in home office litigation where 
alternate facilities were available. See, e.g., Newi v, Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 
1970); Paul J. O'Connell, 31 CCH Tax Ct, Mero. 837 (1972), See also Rev, Rul, 62-180, 
1962-2 CUM. BULL. 52, 53, 
IO. Rev. Ru]. 62-180, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 52, 53. 
11. See Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 52, 54-57. 
Apparently, the Service also inquires into the ability of tlie taxpayer's coemployees 
to complete similar work without the use of a home office. See, e.g., James L. Denison, 
30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1074 (1971), where taxpayers sought a deduction for a home 
office used to prepare lessons necessary to their employment as schoolteachers, The 
Commissioner denied the deduction partly on the grounds that taxpayers were pro• 
vided with a "free period" during which their colleagues were able to complete similar 
work. In granting the deduction, the court refused to compare the taxpayers' work 
habits with those of their colleagues. 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1078, 
12. While the Commissioner has conceded a pro rata deduction for qualifying tax-
payers, see Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 Cm,1. BULL. 52, 53, only recently has the Tax 
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The Commissioner's limited definition of a deductible home office 
expense is predicated on the policy expressed in section 262,13 which 
prohibits the deduction of personal living expenses not expressly 
authorized by other Code provisions.14 The Service's logic may be 
summarized as follows: First, while the use of a home office is job-
related, the facility is also part of a personal residence, and the cost 
of buying and maintaining a residence is a personal living expense. 
The decision not to return to the employer's place of business to do 
the work is solely a matter of personal convenience. Factors bearing 
on that decision may include a desire to be at home with family, a 
preference for more comfortable surroundings, or a dislike of com-
muting. The taxpayer may live a great distance away from work, but 
the location of his dwelling is a matter of personal choice.15 Just as 
the distance between a taxpayer's principal place of residence and 
his place of employment does not make the establishment of a 
Court specified the proper formula for home office cases. In George W. Gino, CCH 
TAX Cr. REP. Dec. 31,990 (May 31, 1973), the Service contended that the appropriate 
formula was the number of hours per week that the office was actually used for job-
related work divided by the total number of hours the facility was available for such 
use (7 days per week times 24 hours per day). CCH TAX Cr. REP. Dec. 31,990, at 2609. 
See Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 52, 54. The Tax Court rejected that formula 
and held that the proper denominator was the total number of hours per week the 
facility was used for any purpose. CCH TAX Cr. REP. Dec. 31,990, at 2609. Thus, if a 
taxpayer used the room for 10 hours per week, 5 hours of which were job-related, the 
court would permit the taxpayer to deduct 50 per cent of all expenses attributable to 
that room. Under the Service's formula, the taxpayer would have been able to deduct 
approximately 3 per cent of that expense. 
The position taken by the Service was surprising in light of International Artists, 
Ltd., 55 T.C. 94 (1970), acquiesed in sub nom. Walter V. Liberace, 1971-2 C-cJM. BULL. 
3, in which the Tax Court held that the proper method for allocating between busi-
ness and personal use of a home was to determine the ratio of the time that the 
premises were used for business purposes to the total actual use of the premises. 55 
T.C.at 105. 
Recently, the Treasury Department proposed that the Congress permit taxpayers to 
deduct, without itemization, up to 500 dollars as a "miscellaneous expense." Included 
within that heading are ten illustrative deductible items, including home office ex-
penses. The deduction, however, would be permitted only if the expense is deductible 
under current law. The proposal, then, seems to be directed more at allowing taxpayers 
with small amounts of deductible expenses to receive deductions without itemizing 
than it is at relaxing the Service's definition of "ordinary and necessary" in relation 
to home office expenses. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE 'TREAsURY, PROPOSALS FOR TAX CHANGE 
107-08, 111 (1973). 
13. See, e.g., Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1970); Stephen A. 
Bodzin, CCH TAX Cr. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 2933 (Sept. 4, 1973) (Featherston, J., dis-
senting); LeRoy W. Gillis, CCH TAX Cr. REP. Dec. 31,945, at 431-32 (April 24, 1973). 
14. "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be 
allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.'' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262. 
15. This view has been adopted by the courts even when the taxpayer is prevented 
from living near his job and thus must pay high transportation costs. See, e.g., Sanders 
v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 296 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971) (civilian em-
ployees not permitted to live on Air Force base); United States v. Taufemer, 407 F.2d 
243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 824 (1969) (employee not permitted to live near 
chemical plant because of presence of dangerous substances). 
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second residence a business necessity,10 neither should the distance 
between the taxpayer's place of employment and his residence make 
the establishment of a home office a business necessity within the 
terms of section 162. Second, the fact that the expenditure involves 
both business and personal elements means that it is difficult to 
allocate costs between deductible and nondeductible expenses. 
The Service's reasoning is similar to that used in determining 
the treatment of a taxpayer who incurs an expense for commuting 
to and from work while carrying tools necessary for the performance 
of his trade or business.17 Expanding on the general premise that 
commuting expenses are personal living expenses and, therefore, not 
deductible, 18 the Commissioner would deny a section 162 deduction 
to the commuter unless he can prove that the expenditure was pri-
marily motivated by business considerations and that the personal 
considerations were incidental.19 The deduction is denied if the moti-
vation is not primarily job-related because it is impossible to allocate 
costs between the business and personal elements when the need to 
transport tools does not alter the taxpayer's manner of commuting.20 
16. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473-74 (1946); Sanders v. Com• 
missioner, 439 F.2d 296, 299 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); Smith v. 
Warren, 388 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1968). 
17. The analogy between the home office and commuting situations was most re-
cently drawn in Stephen A. Bodzin, CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 2934 (Sept. 4, 
1973) (Queally, J., dissenting). 
18. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946); Treas. Reg.§ l.162-2(e) (1958). 
19. Where it is necessary for a musician to use his automobile to transport his 
musical instruments between his residence and his place of work because they arc 
too bulky to be carried otherwise, and he would not use his automobile on such 
trips except for that reason, his transportation expenses are deductible under 
section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Such transportation expenses 
are paid or incurred in carrying on his trade or business because they are occa• 
sioned primarily by the necessity for transporting bulky musical instruments even 
if such expenses would otherwise be nondeductible commuting expenses. 
Revenue Ruling 56-25, C.B. 1956-1, 152 states that expenses incurred by an 
employee in using his automobile for commuting between his place of work 
represent nondeductible personal expenses notwithstanding tl1e fact tliat the auto• 
mobile is also used to transport tools used by the employee in his work. That 
ruling is hereby modified to remove the implication that such transportation ex-
penses would not be deductible even if the employee would not have used his 
automobile on such trips but for the necessity of taking tools with him. 
Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 34, 34-35 (emphasis added). 
20. The expenses incurred by an employee in using his automobile for com-
muting between his place of abode and his place of work (principal or regular 
post of duty or employment), regardless of the distance involved, represent non-
deductible personal expenses within the purview of section 262 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954, notwithstanding the fact that the automobile is also used 
by the employee in his work. The expenses so incurred in going to and from work 
were not increased by reason of the fact that the tools used by the employee in 
his work were also transported in the automobile. Thus, tlie entire amount of the 
expense is deemed to be commuting expense, no part tliereof being allocable to 
the transporting of tlie tools. 
Rev. Rul. 56-25, 1956-1 Cmr. BULL. 152, 152. 
The Service has generally prevailed in tlie Tax Court. See Robert A. Hitt, 55 T.C. 
628 (1971); Harold Gilbert, 55 T.C. 611 (1971). However, two courts of appeals lmvc 
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When the Service's test is satisfied, the taxpayer is permitted to de-
duct the entire cost of his transportation.21 By analogy, the Commis-
sioner would require a taxpayer who seeks to deauct a home office 
expense to establish that he incurred an expense beyond that neces-
sary to satisfy his need to maintain a personal residence.22 
The courts have rejected the Commissioner's position. In Newi 
v. Commissioner,23 the taxpayer, a time salesman for the American 
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), set aside a small room in his apart-
ment for use as a home office. There, to the exclusion of all other 
uses, the taxpayer reviewed the day's selling activities, studied vari-
ous research materials, planned the next day's work, watched tele-
vision advertisements broadcast over all networks, and generally 
sought to improve his value as an employee.24 In denying to the tax-
payer a section 162 deduction of a pro rata share of his rent, the 
Commissioner argued that, because the taxpayer's employer had 
made adequate facilities available during the evening hours, the 
decision to pursue job-related work at home was a matter of per-
sonal convenience and was thus within the general prohibition of 
section 262.25 The Tax Court found for the taxpayer and deter-
mined that the use of the home office was "appropriate and helpful" 
rejected the "but for" test and have required some allocation of the cost of trans-
porting the tools. Tyne v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1967); Sullivan v. 
Commissioner, 368 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1966). Recently the Supreme Court passed on the 
question of allocation in Fausner v. Commissioner, 41 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S., June 25, 
1973), affg. 472 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973). The Court affirmed the court of appeals' 
decision for the Commissioner because the taxpayer could not demonstrate that he 
had incurred an additional expense in carrying his tools to work. For a discussion of 
allocation in the home office context, see note 12 supra. 
21. See Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 CuM. BULL. 34, the relevant portions of which are 
set out in note 19 supra. 
It would seem, however, that, even within the factual situation in which the Service 
allows a deduction, some allocation is possible. For example, the taxpayer could be re-
quired to subtract the amount normally expended in commuting when he is not 
required to carry tools (or an amount equivalent to the cost of public transportation 
if the taxpayer always carried tools) from the amount spent in the operation of his 
personally owned vehicle when he is required to carry tools. This reasoning has been 
applied to work clothing suitable for general wear. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Commissioner, 
262 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959) (L. Hand, J., dissenting); Mortrus v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 
208 (1965). It has also been applied to judges required to have two residences. See, e.g., 
United States v. LeBlanc, 278 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1960); Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 
F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945). For statutory relief afforded to members of Congress, see 
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a). 
22. This approach was apparently adopted by Judge Featherston, who, dissenting 
in Stephen A. Bodzin, noted that "there is nothing to show that [the taxpayer] would 
not have incurred these same rental expenses (or that his rent would have been less) 
if he had found it more convenient to do his overtime work at the office provided and 
maintained for that purpose by his employer." CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 2933 
(Sept. 4, 1973). 
23. 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970), noted in 7 TULSA L.J. 191 (1971). 
24. 432 F.2c;l at 999. 
25, 432 F.2d at 999-1000. 
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in the performance of his business.26 The second circuit affirmed, 
emphasizing the fact that the traffic conditions in Manhattan during 
the early evening hours were such that the taxpayer could not have 
returned to the ABC building after dinner in time to observe the 
television broadcasts.27 The court did not discuss the possibility of 
eating at the employer's place of business. In another case, the Tax 
Court recognized this possibility but apparently did not consider it 
to be a reasonable alternative. 28 
In LeRoy W. Gillis,29 the taxpayer, a district sales manager for 
an insurance company, used his home office to complete monthly 
sales reports, read rules and regulations governing his employer's 
business, interview prospective agents, and maintain a supply of 
forms for his agents. Unlike taxpayer N ewi, however, Gillis appar-
ently was not subject to rigid deadlines or prevented by external 
factors from utilizing a facility provided by his employer.80 Never-
theless, the Tax Court, citing Newi, characterized Gillis' home 
office expense as "appropriate and helpful" and permitted a section 
162 deduction.81 In rejecting the condition-of-employment test 
urged by the Service, the court enumerated several factors that were 
to characterize a permissible deduction: "the distance from [tax-
payer's] regular office to his home, the hazards of working alone at 
night in a one-story building ... , the nature of the work performed 
at home, and the fact that the office was maintained as a separate 
room for business use."82 
The most recent Tax Court pronouncement in this area is in 
Stephen A. Bodzin.88 The taxpayer, an attorney employed by the 
26. George H. Newi, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 686, 691 (1969). 
27. 432 F.2d at 1000. 
28. See Stephen A. Bodzin, CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 32,115 (Sept. 4, 1973). In deter-
mining whether the taxpayer's purpose in maintaining the home office was primarily 
related to business necessities, the court, noting that the taxpayer relied on a car pool 
for transportation to and from work, said that he was confronted with the following 
three choices: "(I) Go home with the car pool and return to the Internal Revenue 
Service offices after dinner; (2) use public transportation or call home for a ride after 
working late at the Internal Revenue Service offices and eating dinner downtown, 
eating no dinner, or postponing dinner until arriving at home: (3) bring work home 
to his home office." CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 2931. The court concluded that 
the taxpayer's selection of the third alternative was motivated by convenience and 
efficiency. CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 2931. This did not remove the home office 
expense from the category of "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. See text 
accompanying note 39 infra. The court did not further discuss the possibility of eating 
elsewhere than at home. 
29. CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 31,945(M) (April 24, 1973). 
30. The court noted that the taxpayer could have completed the journey between 
his home and his regular office in approximately 15 minutes. CCH TAX CT. REP, Dec. 
31,945(M), at 431. 
31. CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 31,945(M), at 432. 
32, CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 31,945(M), at 432. 
33. CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 32,115 (Sept. 4, 1973), 
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Internal Revenue Service's Interpretative Division, utilized a home 
office not only to complete his assigned work, but also "to read 
widely about current developments in the tax law."34 His employer 
did not require him to work after hours, but he did so in order to 
meet what was or what he perceived to be his expected level of per-
formance. 35 Despite the continued availability of the taxpayer's 
principal place of work, the Tax Court held that the maintenance of 
the home office was "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's con-
duct of business and thus deductible under section 162.36 In so 
holding, the majority rejected the Service's attempt to reinterpret 
Revenue Ruling 62-180. The Commissioner, retreating from the 
position that a home office expenditure is deductible only if its 
maintenance is required by the taxpayer's employer as a condition 
of employment, had asserted that "the examples set forth in Rev. 
Rul. 62-180 ... make it clear that the term 'required as a condi-
tion of employment' means required in order to properly perform 
the employment duties."37 The court characterized the Service's re-
interpretation as overly strict38 and held: 
The applicable test for judging the deductibility of home office ex-
penses is whether, like any other business expense, the maintenance 
of an office in the home is appropriate and helpful under all the 
circumstances .... That the maintenance of the home office can be 
characterized as "a matter of convenience" due to the existence of 
duplicate employer-provided facilities does not void the conclusion 
that the expenditure is appropriate and helpful.39 
The position of the courts, especially in Bodzin, seems more in 
accord with the wording of the Code than does that of the Commis-
sioner. Under the Code the sole decision to be made is whether the 
home office is an "ordinary and necessary" business expense as de-
scribed by section 162, because section 262, by its express terms, 
excludes only those personal, living, and family expenses that are 
not permitted under another section of the Code. 
While the employer sets out the general requirements of the job, 
the employee must make marginal decisions on how to carry on his 
business of being an employee. The decision of where to perform 
after-hours work seems to fall into the latter category. Taxpayers 
34. CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 2930. 
35. CCH TAX Cr. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 2930. 
36. CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 2932-33. 
37. CCH TAX Cr. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 2932. 
38. "We think [the Service's reinterpretation] is also unsatisfactory in that 'required' 
can be interpreted strictly as meaning 'absolutely essential' or 'absolutely necessary' 
and such an interpretation leads to the imposition of a standard which is too strict. 
Therefore, we ••• reject the rehabilitated version of [Revenue Ruling 62-180]." CCH 
TAX CT. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 2932. 
39. CCH TAX Cr. REP. Dec. 32,115, at 2932. 
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Newi, Gillis, and Bodzin all alleged nonfrivolous reasons for work-
ing at home. Their decisions were based in part on convenience and 
personal preferences, but deductions are allowed for many expenses 
that are based in part on these factors. Any taxpayer choices regard-
ing the manner in which he furnishes his office, his mode of trans-
portation on business trips, and his style of living while traveling 
( constrained only by the "lavish or extravagant" limitation found 
in section 162(a)(2)) are influenced by convenience, efficiency, and 
personal preference factors. The personal comfort and satisfaction 
produced do not remove such expenditures from the category of 
"ordinary and necessary" business expenses. In the area of job-related 
educational expenses, for example, the courts have allowed section 
162 deductions for expenditures motivated by the taxpayer's judg-
ments as to how he might best fulfill his duties. In Hill v. Commis-
sioner,40 the taxpayer, a schoolteacher, was required either to read 
five books or to attend summer classes at a university. Despite the 
fact that the taxpayer's choice to attend classes was motivated in 
part by personal preference, the court permitted the taxpayer to 
take the full deduction.41 In Campbell v. United States,42 the tax-
payer attended law school in order better to understand his role as 
a pathologist for the city of Philadelphia. While the taxpayer was 
- not required to attend law school as a condition of his employment, 
he was allowed a deduction for the cost of his tuition. Finally, in 
Coughlin v. Commissioner,48 the taxpayer, an attorney, was allowed 
to deduct the expense of a tax seminar. Although he may have been 
able to learn as much about the tax law through less expensive 
methods, the Court permitted the deduction as "appropriate and 
helpful" to the conduct of his business. 
The only real role played by section 262 is to require that home 
office expenses be allocated according to the portion that is related 
to personal use and the portion that is business-related. The alloca-
tion problems that arise in the tool-transportation situation44 are 
not presented by the home office cases. The problem of allocating 
costs between the business and personal elements of commuting 
to work while carrying tools arises because the two functions are 
performed simultaneously. In contrast, a taxpayer who uses an area 
as a home office cannot himself simultaneously utilize that same 
area for personal, living, or family purposes. Thus, he is able to 
calculate objectively the amount expended to maintain the home 
40. 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950). 
41. The court was applying section 23(a)(l)(A) of the 1939 Code, Revenue Act of 
1942, ch. 619, § 12l(a), 56 Stat. 819, amending Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(a)(l), 
53 Stat. 12, which did not differ from the current section 162 in any material respect. 
42, 393 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1968), 
43. 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953). 
44. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra. 
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office for business use by measuring the amount of space and time 
devoted to that purpose.46 
The Commissioner has developed methods of allocating between 
the business and private aspects of a home office in those cases where 
the employer has required that the employee maintain a home 
office.46 The problem of allocation is no different where the em-
ployer does not require the office but the employee finds it "appro-
priate and helpful." The Commissioner's stand ignores the plain 
language of the Code and confuses convenience-an element in every 
business decision-·with the personal living expenses that cannot be 
deducted due to the prohibition of section 262. The Commissioner's 
continued stand forces taxpayers who have legitimate business ex-
penses to undergo expensive litigation in order to sustain a deduc-
tion clearly authorized by the Code. 
45. For a discussion of the formulas proposed by the Commissioner and the Tax 
Court for calculating the amount of the deduction, see note 12 supra. 
46. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 Cu11r. BuLL. 52, 54-57 (examples 1-3, 5). 
